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Abstract  
Inappropriate speed and speeding are among the highest causes of crashes in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Truck drivers are subjected to a broad range of influences on their behaviour including 
industrial pressures, company monitoring and police enforcement. Further, drivers have a high level 
of autonomy over their own behaviour. As such it is important to understand how these external 
influences interact with commonly shared beliefs, attitudes and values of heavy vehicle drivers to 
influence their behaviour. The present study uses a re-conceptualisation of safety culture to explore 
the behaviours of driving at an inappropriate speed and speeding in the heavy vehicle industry. A 
series of case studies, consisting of interviews and ride-along observations, were conducted with 
three transport organisations to explore the effect of culture on safety in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Results relevant to inappropriate speed are reported and discussed. It was found that organisational 
management through monitoring, enforcement and payment, police enforcement, customer 
standards and vehicle design factors could all reduce the likelihood of driving at inappropriate 
speeds under some circumstances. However, due to weaknesses in the ability to accurately monitor 
appropriate speed, this behaviour was primarily influenced by cultural beliefs, attitudes and values. 
Truck drivers had a tendency to view speeding as relatively safe, had a desire to speed to save time 
and increase personal income, and thus often attempted to speed without detection. When drivers 
saw speeding as dangerous, however, they were more likely to drive safely. Implications for 
intervention are discussed. 
Introduction  
Inappropriate speed and speeding are among the highest causes of crashes in the heavy vehicle 
industry. Driving above the posted speed limit and/or too fast for the conditions is a well-known 
risk factor for traffic incidents. Driscoll (2013) reported on 461 major heavy vehicle crashes in 
2011, stating that inappropriate speed was responsible for 25.4% of these crashes. This figure was 
reportedly lower than in previous years. Chen and Chen (2011) examined 10 years of crash data 
from Illinois, USA, finding that speed influences the severity of outcomes in single-vehicle truck 
crashes, yet not multiple vehicle crashes (lack of an increase in severity in multi-vehicle crashes 
may be associated with the likely severity of a light vehicle crashing with a heavy vehicle, 
regardless of speed, due to the size and mass of the truck). Finally, Brodie, Lyndal and Elias (2009) 
analysed coroners’ reports, finding that excessive and/or inappropriate speed was involved in 43.1% 
of fatalities in which speed was documented. 
A number of researchers have indicated that safety culture could provide a useful avenue for 
improving safety in the heavy vehicle industry (Gander et al., 2011; McCorry & Murray, 1993; 
Short, Boyle, Shackelford, Inderbitzen, & Bergoffen, 2007). Safety culture has seen significant 
attention within the literature in recent years, and there is significant debate about the nature of 
safety culture and how it can be defined (see reviews by Choudhry, Fang, & Mohamed, 2007; 
Edwards, Davey, & Armstrong, 2013; Guldenmund, 2000). There are two major approaches to 
safety culture in the literature. One views safety culture primarily in terms of organisational 
structures and systems, and has been called a normative or functionalist approach (Edwards et al., 
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2013; Nævestad, 2009). The other views safety culture primarily in terms of shared beliefs, attitudes 
and values, and is referred to as an anthropological or interpretive approach (Edwards et al., 2013; 
Nævestad, 2009).  
In a previously published review, the authors examined journal articles about heavy vehicle driver 
health and safety identifying a broad range of influences on health and safety in heavy vehicle 
industries (Edwards, Davey, & Armstrong, 2014). These included government regulations and 
enforcement, organisational factors, customer pressures and requirements and road/environmental 
factors. In addition to these external factors, it should be noted that heavy vehicle drivers have a 
high level of autonomy over their own behaviour (Arboleda, Morrow, Crum, & Shelley Ii, 2003). 
Further, Sully (2001) suggested that due to the amount of time heavy vehicle drivers spend away 
from their depot means that they are more likely to associate themselves with an industry wide road 
culture than to a specific transport company. Thus, to understand speeding in the heavy vehicle 
industry, there is a need to explore both external and internal influences on speeding, and to look 
beyond the traditional boundaries of an organisation. This presents a barrier to the application of the 
two traditional approaches to safety culture, which typically focus on one of these aspects in 
isolation and within the confines of a single organisation. The authors previously presented an 
alternative approach to safety culture in which safety culture is viewed in terms of the combined 
impact of both external contextual elements and shared beliefs attitudes and values (Edwards et al., 
2013). More importantly, this framework held that safety related behaviours were influenced by the 
interactions between cultural and contextual factors. To date there is no strong evidence to suggest 
that culture can be deliberately changed (Edwards et al., 2013; Nævestad, 2009), however, by 
understanding the existing culture and how it interacts with contextual factors, it may be possible to 
change these contextual factors to work with the culture of a workforce to improve safety (Edwards 
et al., 2013, 2015). The present study uses this framework of safety culture to explore the effect of 
culture on speeding in the heavy vehicle industry. 
Method 
A series of three qualitative case studies with transport organisations were conducted to investigate 
safety culture within the Australian heavy vehicle industry. These case studies formed a collective 
case study (Stake, 2005), in which the three organisations chosen for the research were selected to 
provide insight into the broader industry. The case studies were conducted using a combination of 
ethnographic methods (interviews and participant observations) and grounded theory analysis 
techniques (specifically those of Corbin & Strauss, 1990).   
Participating Organisations 
The three participating organisations (identified here as Company A, B & C), were selected on the 
basis of knowledge from a series of preliminary interviews. These interviews indicated that both 
safety and the culture in the industry differed depending on the location, type of vehicles used and 
goods transported, distance of the haul, and the size of the company. The three companies were 
selected to sample this diversity to enable similarities and differences to emerge. These 
differentiating characteristics for each company can be seen in table 1. 
Table 1. Case study organisation characteristics 
 Company A Company B Company C 
Company Size Medium (~50 trucks) Medium (~50 trucks) Small (<10 trucks) 
Location Type Capital city Capital city Regional centre 
Major Freight Task General goods Specialised freight Livestock 
Typical Distance  
Carried 
Medium-long (intra- 
and inter-state) 
Local (plus some 
medium-long 
Short-medium (within 
region) 
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Main truck types Semi’s and B-Doubles Rigid, crane mounted, 
heavy haulage, long 
loads, semi’s and B-
doubles 
Semi’s, B-doubles and 
road trains 
 
Company A is a medium-sized family-owned and operated transport company. The organisation 
employs approximately 100 staff and owns over 50 prime movers. Semi-structured interviews and 
observations were conducted with 10 staff members. Four managerial, administrative and 
operational staff (two managers, one health and safety officer and one operations manager), along 
with six heavy vehicle drivers, took part in interviews. Six observations were also conducted with 
heavy vehicle drivers. 
Company B is a medium sized transport company, employing approximately 100 staff with over 50 
trucks. Due to the diversity within Company B, the organisation has a number of managers 
overseeing branches within the company. Ten interviews were conducted within Company B. 
Participants consisted of the compliance officer, and part owner, of the company, two regional 
managers who each oversee approximately half of the fleet, five branch or depot managers, two 
driver trainers, and an operational manager. Eight observations were conducted, typically covering 
a driver’s shift. 
Company C is a small-sized transport company based in a regional centre. Family owned and 
operated, the organisation consists of six prime movers and various trailers, and employs between 
six and 10 people at any point in time. Five interviews were conducted with the owner/manager, 
compliance officer, two drivers, and the owner/driver/head-mechanic. Three observations were 
conducted. 
Method 
The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours and covered a variety of topics. The first 
questions were typically aimed at eliciting information regarding the history of the individual and 
identifying major safety concerns in their work role. Later questions sought to identify contextual, 
cultural and behavioural factors which influence these safety concerns. Participants were asked 
about specific behaviours and outcomes which were not spontaneously discussed. Prompts were 
seldom required as participants appeared eager to share their perspectives on safety. 
Typically conducted after the interviews, observations of drivers occurred during drivers’ usual 
shifts. Most observations lasted the duration of the shift, although some lasted for a portion of the 
shift (range of durations was 4-15 hours, with the exception of two which occurred to take the 
researcher to another depot). During observations the researcher conducted informal interviews 
similar in nature to the staff member interviews. Additionally, questions were asked which 
specifically related to tasks witnessed. 
Results and Discussion 
Throughout the case studies a significant degree of congruence was found across members of the 
three companies. As the case study companies were selected to provide a broad overview of 
perceptions within the industry from differing subsections, this congruence allowed the case studies 
to be interpreted collectively as originally intended. This gives support to the notion of an industry 
wide culture, and for the purpose of this paper, differences between companies will be noted where 
relevant however, the majority of discussion will incorporate responses from members of each 
company to shift focus away from specific companies and toward a broader industry focus. It 
should be noted that during observations and interviews with drivers only hand written notes were 
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taken, reducing the possible length of quotes. Conversely, during interview that occurred with staff 
members, audio recordings were made. As such, the majority of large quotes are from managers. 
Nonetheless, the quality of hand-written notes permitted analysis to be conducted both on verbatim 
quotes from audio recordings and the detailed written notes. As such, while the majority of reported 
quotes are from managers, the analysis allowed equal voice to drivers and staff members. 
Participants generally acknowledged speeding to encompass both driving at an unsafe speed for the 
conditions and exceeding the posted speed limit. Heavy vehicles are legally required to be speed 
limited to prevent speeds exceeding 100km/h. As such, this limiting technology only reduces 
speeding on highways with a posted speed limit of 100km/h or greater. Thus, it was concerning that 
many participants tended to define speeding as exceeding 100km/h. When asked about speeding 
one Company B driver stated, due to the speed limiter, “I can’t speed”. Similarly, the 
driver/manager of Company C (both is the manager and drives a truck) said that their drivers “can’t 
speed because they’re limited”. Given that heavy vehicles can easily exceed lower posted speed 
limits this perception is clearly flawed, but highlights that some participants thought speeding was 
not a possibility. 
There were a broad range of factors suggested by participants to be associated with speeding 
behaviour and the likelihood of outcomes. These included both contextual and cultural factors. For 
the purpose of the present discussion contextual factors will be discussed in brief to leave room for 
greater discussion of cultural beliefs, attitudes and values. 
Contextual factors influencing speeding 
Many of the contextual factors identified by participants as being related to speeding and speed-
related crashes were obvious or commonly known risk factors. These included factors such as 
inclement weather reducing the safe speed of travel, other vehicles and road works causing delays 
which lead to increased work pressures. Of particular importance however were the roles of law 
enforcement, organisations and customers.  
Law enforcement and speeding 
Traffic law enforcement is a cornerstone to road safety strategies worldwide. With regards to heavy 
vehicles and speeding there were three main methods of monitoring and enforcement. These were 
(1) speed limiters (on all heavy vehicles except those too old for the technology), (2) fixed camera 
enforcement (standard and point-to-point), and (3) mobile enforcement. Whilst each of these has 
some merit, there were weaknesses identified by participants which reduce their deterrent effect. 
Speed limiters were seen as easy to tamper with for those who wish to do so. More importantly, 
however, in addition to the fact that speed limiters only set a maximum speed, which does not adapt 
to varying speed zones, it was noted that the mechanism by which speed limiters operate does not 
prevent speeding downhills. 
The road speed is gutted at 100km/h. They will go faster than that off a hill because they’re 
not gear-bound at 100km/h but I think they’ll top out at just over 120 or something like that, 
130. (Company A Manager One) 
Standard speed cameras were generally seen as ineffective as truck drivers become familiar with the 
roads they travel and know the exact locations of each camera they will pass. Thus, they only need 
to watch their speed in these places. Further, point-to-point speed cameras were seen as easy to 
overcome, as every truck driver is aware of the legal times and many will time their trip and wait 
before passing the next camera. Additionally, delays afford additional time for drivers allowing 
them to speed through lower speed limit sections without triggering fines. 
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SAFE-T Cams don’t stop you from speeding. There are hills between the cams so you lose 
speed up the hills and can go like hell down them... Going through towns slows you down so 
you go like stink on the highway and at daytime you hit traffic lights which can add five 
minutes to your time. (Company A Driver Six) 
Finally, while mobile enforcement has benefits, the use of UHF radios allows truck drivers to be 
aware of police locations at all times on the road. Overall, these issues mean that there is an absence 
of certainty of punishment for speeding, and thus a very limited level of deterrence. Thus, it is seen 
as unlucky to be caught for speeding. 
I have had two speeding tickets from running off hills in the past seven months... just my bad 
luck that when I did it there was a cop down the bottom, plus I was on the wrong radio 
station so I didn’t hear about them. (Company A Driver Six) 
Transport organisations and speeding 
The organisation’s primary roles in speeding come from the method in which they pay drivers, and 
the approaches used to monitor and enforce speed adherence. Starting with the payment of drivers, 
hourly rates were associated with safer behaviour as driving slower results in greater income. 
Conversely, as stated by one Company B driver, payment by the kilometre or load is a “good 
incentive to drive fast”, as travelling the same distance in less time is a more efficient way to earn 
money. Of the three participating companies, Company A paid a km rate for all long distance 
drivers, but an hourly rate for local drivers, Company B paid all their drivers an hourly rate, finally 
Company C drivers are paid a salary (which was comparable to a load rate due to the inability to 
earn overtime if the load takes too long).  
Basically the drivers over at (previous employer location), they’re getting paid a kilometre 
rate. So it’s in their own interest to go like gun it all the time and they do gun it all the 
time... Over here they get paid on an hourly rate so they’re not actually achieving anything 
by speeding and obviously our trucks are regulated to down to 95km and theirs are still 105, 
110km. (Company B Branch Manager Two) 
Each company relied on two primary means to monitor speed compliance – satellite tracking and 
speeding infringement notices from government departments. The satellite tracking methods of each 
company were capable of reporting current speeds and sending alerts to managers when vehicles 
exceed a chosen speed limit. Though they can be used to alert managers to different speeds in 
different locations, thus monitoring all speeding above the posted speed limit, they were typically 
only used to detect speeds in excess of the speed limiter. Company C managers did indicate that 
they will on occasions actively watch the tracking monitor and (from memory) determine whether 
the vehicle was speeding on a given road, however, this only occurred sporadically. Company B did 
implement specific speed zones in two locations, one of which was near a depot, and the other was 
on a specific road within a major city. These locations were monitored due to either past speeding 
fines or complaints by local residents regarding their trucks. As such, while there are cases of 
satellite tracking being used more thoroughly, satellite tracking was predominantly only used to 
detect speeding down hills, or speed limiters that have been subjected to tampering. 
Tampering with speed limiters is easy, you just put a wire or a box over it but you can’t do it 
without being caught. Satellite tracking shows vehicle over limited speed for an extended 
period of time and you know they have tampered. People are sacked immediately for it, has 
happened a few times. (Company A Driver Three) 
Enforcement of speeding in each company was largely through non-conformance notices. For first 
offences and minor breaches, non-conformance notices were typically used to inform the driver that 
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they were detected and to remind them to comply with the upper speed limit. Within Company A, 
one driver suggested that individual offences go unpunished, and that drivers will be reminded to 
slow down, yet that repeated offences are followed by non-conformance notifications, and/or one 
week without work and payment. However, one Company A driver stated that he “had this truck up 
to 120m/h downhill but it was never followed up”. 
...we normally ring up the driver and say: Oh what’s the problem how come you put your 
foot down or what happened there? And we try and monitor that as well... Of course then we 
sort of have to say: Right, you know you’re going to get chastised for it. You know you’re 
not in deep shit just keep it down, keep your speed back like don’t run it off the hills. 
(Company A Operations staff Member) 
Finally, infringement notices provided by police to the organisation gives additional monitoring. In 
the few cases where drivers trigger a point to point or fixed camera the infringement is sent to the 
company, who may then reprimand the driver as desired. 
Customers and speeding 
Whilst customer pressures may encourage speeding, it was generally stated that customers seek to 
ensure driver speed compliance due to their chain of responsibility requirements. This primarily 
occurred through auditing company records of traffic infringements and satellite tracking, and how 
the company manages these. However, it should be again stated that there are weaknesses in these 
methods of detecting speeding. 
We're closely monitored … there’s a lot of trucks here that are painted (colour with 
customer name) on the side. We do a lot of work for them. We’re very closely monitored and 
essentially they even do their own audit on us every six or 12 months... To make sure we’re 
not breaking the law. (Company A Manager One) 
Contextual factors: Summary 
From the above contextual factors it can be seen that there is a relative lack of successful 
monitoring and enforcement of speeding in the heavy vehicle industry. Police enforcement was only 
seen as effective in the immediate presence of fixed cameras or mobile enforcement (as drivers 
know their location), and had limited lasting influence on behaviour. Similarly, the three 
organisations only successfully monitor tampering with speed limiters or running of hills. Finally, 
while customers may require evidence of the management of speed, due to limitations in 
organisational monitoring, this is not sufficiently beneficial. On the other hand, payment methods 
used by the company can provide incentive to either speed or drive slower. Overall this means there 
is an absence of sufficient external motivation to adhere to speed limits, and in some cases there is 
incentive to speed. 
The influence of culture on speeding 
A number of the common beliefs, attitudes or values were identified throughout the case studies as 
having relevance to speeding. These broadly included seeing speeding as unintentional, viewing 
speed limiters as unfair, the value placed on time, and a collection of traits related to learning styles 
and the results these have on behaviour.  
Speeding as unintentional 
Generally speaking, there was a tendency to excuse speeding behaviour as merely unintentional. As 
stated by one manager from Company A, “everyone does it, it’s not a purposeful thing”. One health 
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and safety officer, who previously worked in road design, even indicated that truck drivers may 
miss the posted speed limit and drive at the speed that ‘feels’ right for the road. This unintentional 
speeding was linked to the need for drivers to measure travel time between point to point cameras, 
even though this was also linked with deliberate punishment-avoidance strategies. Though it is clear 
that such behaviour can occur unintentionally, it is concerning that one of the major risk factors for 
crashes could be simply dismissed as unintended, and there is a need to address this issue. To 
prevent unintentional speeding, the use of GPS systems which inform drivers when they exceed the 
speed limit could be beneficial for the industry. 
Speed limiting as unfair 
Throughout the case studies it was evident that drivers also placed a high value on fairness, thus 
disliking rules or regulations that they thought were not fairly implemented. The requirement of 
trucks to be speed limited was often deemed unfair. While it was not suggested that cars be speed 
limited to the same speeds as trucks, it was argued that cars should not be designed to travel as fast 
as current designs permit. For this reason one Company B manager stated that truck drivers feel like 
‘sitting ducks’. That is, truck drivers felt that they were being unevenly regulated when compared to 
other vehicle drivers. This perception of unfair treatment has the potential to develop an ‘us and 
them’ mentality leading to feelings of hostility and resistance to regulations. Importantly, it should 
be noted that this feeling that the regulations are unfair does not mean that they disagree with the 
regulation, only its unfair application. 
From the truck driver’s perspective I guess he feels like a bit of a sitting duck. you know. It 
is hard to control but...governed, trucks are governed to 90, cars can do 220. Why do they 
need to do 200? Why on earth do we have a car that does 220km/h and gets sold to a 17-
year-old on his birthday? There’s nowhere in Australia you can do 220km/h, doesn’t need to 
go that fast. (Company B Branch Manager Four) 
Value placed on time 
Truck drivers commonly placed a high value on time. This has clear implications for speeding, as 
driving faster reduces travel time. As was discussed above, payment methods can provide an 
incentive for speeding. The effect of payment was seen to have a direct impact on driver’s 
perceptions of the importance of time. In fact, drivers from company A (where local drivers are paid 
an hourly rate) commonly indicated that “on local time doesn’t matter coz you’re paid by the hour”. 
However, non-financial motivations for saving time also had an influence on speeding. For 
example, one Company A driver stated that it is beneficial to reach a destination sooner in order to 
sleep before the sun rises. Point-to-point speed cameras that have short intervals (e.g. 30 minutes 
maximum between cameras, can reduce this effect, as speeding would result in regular stopping. 
Nonetheless, as drivers experience delays between many cameras, it was indicated that they speed 
to catch up on lost time. Further, it was highlighted that in order to make up for delays and save 
time, truck drivers may speed through lower speed limit zones. 
So they get to an 80km/h zone or a 70 or a 60 and they just keep on going. They come into 
an 80km/h zone and say keep doing 100. And I'm sure you’re guilty of doing it... you know 
you go down the road and it drops back to 80 for a section or whatever and you just keep it 
at whatever was the cruise control was set at. And it’s the same as truck drivers that have 
been stuffed around for the last hour by someone so they just hold it flat through a village to 
make up that time. (Company A Manager One)  
Is speeding safe or dangerous? 
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It was evident that every truck driver who participated in the study placed a very high priority on 
safety. That is to say, when drivers felt that a particular course of action could lead to a crash or 
injuries for themselves or others, they would avoid the act. Conversely, they would always seek to 
conduct a behaviour they felt would improve safety. A large number of participants indicated that 
they perceived speeding to be a hazardous behaviour. As stated by the driver/manager of Company 
C “it’s dangerous to speed, shit yeah”. Similarly one Company C driver stated that another driver 
involved in a crash “was lucky he wasn’t going faster”. More generally, one Company A driver said 
“these things (trucks) are too dangerous (to speed) as far as I’m concerned”. Conversely, a number 
of drivers did not hold these same views. For example, one Company A driver disregarded the 
effects of speed by suggesting that speed was irrelevant if someone cuts in front of you. As this 
driver believed that most incidents were caused by other vehicles, speeding was not considered 
dangerous, as the principle cause was not speeding, but the behaviour of others. The primary 
mechanism through which truck drivers determined what was safe and dangerous was their own 
experience and stories of other drivers. It was common throughout the observations for drivers to 
explain why they believed a specific action either increased or decreased safety from their own 
experiences as well as stories of other drivers. This may have a long historical basis in the industry as, in 
past years, truck drivers were often left with the sole responsibility of safety, while managers and 
organisations gave little priority to safety. While this has shifted, there is still a reliance on personal 
experience and being told stories by other drivers. 
It wouldn’t even be the last 20 years where there’s been a big focus on safety and I'm not 
saying it’s wrong, I totally agree with it. But before that, like when I was driving... your 
mate might come along to you and say oh just be careful tying that down it might slip and 
that sort of thing but there’s no real focus on safety. (Company B Region Manager Two) 
‘Normalisation of deviance’ was a phrase first used to describe a process evident in the challenger space 
shuttle disaster. Vaughan (1996) argued that after successive disaster-free flights involving shuttles with 
the same flaws present in the Challenger shuttle, members of NASA began to believe the flaws were 
acceptable. This process of past experiences justifying unsafe acts was referred to as normalisation of 
deviance. In the case of the heavy vehicle industry, while crashes a far too common at an industry wide 
level, for the individual driver or company, crashes are a very rare event. Thus, the reliance on stories 
and experience creates a vulnerability to normalisation of deviance within the industry. One Company 
A manager stated that the organisation had experienced very few speed-related crashes, as they 
were mostly related to other causes, and this was immediately preceded with discussions regarding 
truck drivers choosing to speed through towns. The lack of experienced incidents that were 
attributed to speed led to a false confidence in the safety of speeding. 
A lot of the highway is 100 but through the towns and that it is somewhat of an issue 
because blokes like to make up time so of course they speed through towns. We have very, 
very few speed-related crashes. They’re normally road condition-related or stupidity-
related or fatigue-related. (Company A Manager One) 
The same manager indicated that one driver from the company had previously spun a truck on a 
highway at high speeds in the wet, yet attributed this not to speed but to the stupidity of the driver. 
This view was mirrored in the perspectives given by many drivers regarding speed, and highlights 
how false causal attributions can shape beliefs regarding the dangers associated with speeding. It 
should be noted however, that due to the reliance on stories and personal experience, the use of 
stories also presents an avenue for effective training. Incident reports were used by company B in 
their training for a variety of safety behaviours (no specific examples of speeding were discussed by 
participants), and with these behaviours, there was seen to be a high level of compliance due to a 
belief that these behaviours were important to safety. 
The results of seeing speeding as safe 
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Regarding government legislation and rules, a number of Company B drivers suggested that speed 
limit compliance held significant safety benefits. One driver in particular stated that “you do the 
speed limits for a reason, the signs are on the road for a reason, they’re there for safety”. This belief 
that the rules exist for safety extended to many drivers with a belief that speeding was dangerous. 
Unfortunately, however, many drivers did not hold positive views towards speeding regulations due 
to a belief that speeding is relatively safe. For these drivers, they would speed, if they could do so 
without being detected. That is, when a driver views speeding as relatively safe, their own speeding 
behaviour is predominantly modified by a desire to avoid punishment, either through avoiding 
detection, or where not possible, temporary compliance. Given the findings with relation to 
monitoring and enforcement, it can be expected that this means that these drivers have the ability to 
regularly speed in zones with a posted speed limit lower than the speed limiter installed in the 
vehicle, or when going down hills. This again highlights the need for drivers to believe that 
speeding is relevant to safety. 
Conclusions 
The case studies reported in this paper were conducted with three transport organisations taken from 
distinct sections of the industry, which according to industry members should have been quite 
different. The high level of congruence between each company given some support to Sully’s 
(2001) assertion that there may be a broad industry wide culture, pervading beyond the traditional 
organisational boundaries used in safety culture research. Nonetheless, it should be recognised that 
without further research confirming these findings apply more broadly throughout the industry, the 
results of this paper should be interpreted with caution and not generalised across an entire industry.  
A broad range of cultural and contextual factors were identified which were relevant to speeding. 
Consistent with past research, there were influences from government departments, organisations 
and customers which had the ability to influence aspects of speeding (Edwards et al., 2014). 
Additionally there were a number of cultural beliefs, attitudes and values which were identified in 
the responses of participants. Whilst these included specific attitudes towards speed limiters and a 
view that speeding was at times unintentional, they also included the value placed on time and a 
series of beliefs and attitudes related to the value drivers place on safety and the tendency to learn 
primarily through experience and stories. In both of these later cases, it was evident that there were 
interactions between cultural and contextual factors which led to specific behavioural patterns, 
supporting the use of the current framework (Edwards et al., 2013).  
It was evident that drivers placed a high value on time, and that this could lead to choosing to speed 
to save time, or make up for delays. Some of the reasons highlighted for this by participants could 
be seen a common for many light vehicle drivers, such as a desire to get home quickly, and some 
were specific to heavy vehicle driving, such as wanting to get to a safe rest location in time to sleep 
before the sun rises making sleep difficult. That unsafe behaviour can be associated with an attempt 
to make up lost time is not new, and was also notably demonstrated by Snyder (2012) in an 
ethnographic study of a driver driving through fatigue in order to make up for loading delays. 
Importantly, the current study demonstrated the relationship between payment models and speeding 
to make up time. Participants clearly stated that payment by the km or load (which is 
interchangeable as a given load has a predetermined location and thus distance to travel) is an 
incentive to speed in order to make the same amount of money in less time. Conversely, payment 
by the hour was seen to reduce the value placed on time, as delays and slower travel times actually 
increase the driver’s income for the same load. The relationship between payment and safety is also 
not new as such. The Australian Transport Workers’ Union (TWU) has long lobbied for ‘safe rates’. 
Of particular note, the TWU placed a submission to the Road Safety Remuneration Tribunal 
arguing that drivers are often not paid for waiting times, and feel pressured to speed (Transport 
Workers' Union, 2012). Past research has also supported the link between payment and safety. 
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Belzer, Rodriguez and Sedo (2002) found that within the USA heavy vehicle industry higher levels 
of payment were associated with lower crash rates. Further, Williamson (2007) found that 
Australian heavy vehicle drivers were more likely to use illegal stimulants if they were paid a 
distance rate, or were paid below the award rate. The current findings support the need for pay 
which doesn’t provide an incentive to speed. The findings from this study add to the arguments that 
the TWU have offered, and show similar trends to that which Williamson revealed with stimulant 
use, indicating that regardless of the amount of pay received, payment per km will always give 
incentive to travel faster and avoid delays. Thus to limit the incentive to speed, it is recommended 
that distance and load based payment be eliminated in favour of an hourly payment. 
The second series of interactions were based around the priority drivers give to safety and the 
tendency for drivers to learn what is safe through experience and stories. The findings highlighted 
that drivers can be vulnerable to normalisation of deviance (Vaughan, 1996), and when this occurs, 
resulting in drivers viewing speeding as safe, they will seek to avoid punishment through either 
driving at the legal speed limit when in the presence of police enforcement or speeding while 
avoiding detection. Existing monitoring techniques were found to be insufficient to regularly detect 
and deter speeding. While there is a need to improve these methods of monitoring, without passing 
legislation to download vehicle data, or force organisations to monitor speed in all zones, it may be 
difficult to truly ensure speeding doesn’t go undetected or develop sufficient deterrence. However, 
as was briefly indicated, it may be possible to increase internal motivation to drive at a safe speed 
through the use of speed-related incident reports in training. There is a clear need to ensure drivers 
have a firm belief that speeding is dangerous. 
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